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ABSTRACT. We study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests. Com-
mittee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best, but each member can acquire
privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule. In the ex-
periment, as predicted by Bayesian equilibrium, voters are more likely to acquire information under
majority rule, and attempt to counter the bias in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule. As
opposed to Bayesian equilibrium predictions, however, many committee members vote when un-
informed. Moreover, uninformed voting is strongly associated with a lower propensity to acquire
information. We show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs can account for both
these phenomena, and provides a good overall fit to the observed patterns of behavior both in terms
of rational ignorance and biases.
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On trouve de plus, que si la probabilité de la voix de chaque Votant est plus grande
que 12 , c’est-à-dire, s’il est plus probable qu’il jugera conformément à la vérité, plus
le nombre des Votans augmentera, plus la probabilité de la vérité de la décision sera
grande : la limite de cette probabilité sera la certitude [. . . ]
Une assemblée très-nombreuse ne peut pas être composée d’hommes très-éclairés;
il est même vraisemblable que ceux qui la forment joindront sur bien des objets
beaucoup d’ignorance à beaucoup de préjugés.
Condorcet (1785)[1986, p. 29-30]
1. INTRODUCTION
The idea that a committee or a jury may make better choices than a single individual, by aggre-
gating the information dispersed among the group members, was first given a statistical foundation
by Condorcet (1785), and has been very influential in social choice and in democratic theory, pro-
viding an epistemic foundation for the use of majority rule in a variety of contexts. During the last
two decades, Condorcet’s jury theorem has been studied from a game-theoretic viewpoint, starting
with the pioneering work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). The game theoretic approach has
led to some valuable insights about strategic voting behavior and the comparative performance of
different voting rules in terms of information aggregation and efficiency.
This literature, however, has paid comparatively little attention to two potential sources of dif-
ficulty for information aggregation. First, group members may attempt to free ride on others,
declining to acquire costly information. Second, realizing that their individual influence on the
collective decision is small, group members may allow themselves to be carried away by prej-
udice. As a result, group members’ opinions may actually contain little information about the
alternatives, weakening the aggregation result. Indeed, as the initial quotation makes clear, Con-
dorcet was aware of the possibility of both ignorance and biased judgment clouding the opinion of
jury members.
In this paper, we investigate theoretically and experimentally a problem of information aggre-
gation in committees where information is costly, thus providing incentives for group members to
attempt to free ride on others. In particular, we propose a model in which each committee mem-
ber is allowed to obtain costly private information about which of two alternatives is best for the
group, with the individual cost of information being a privately observed random variable. After
each committee member independently decides whether or not to acquire information, they vote
in favor of either alternative, or abstain. We consider two voting rules here, simple majority, the
classical setting for the analysis of information aggregation in committees, and unanimity, which
is known to make strategic behavior more involved (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
We study the Bayesian equilibrium of the game just described. We show that, under majority
rule, symmetric, neutral Bayesian equilibria are characterized by a cost cutoff: if a committee
member’s cost of information acquisition falls below the cutoff, the individual acquires informa-
tion, and votes according to the signal received. If instead a committee member’s cost of infor-
mation acquisition falls above the cutoff, the individual does not acquire information and abstains.
Intuitively, uninformed individuals realize that their vote may reduce the probability of reaching the
best collective choice if other individuals cast informed votes, an effect dubbed the swing voter’s
curse (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996). Because of the public good nature of information acqui-
sition, increasing the size of the committee reduces the probability that a single individual acquires
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information; the net effect however, is to increase the total amount of information acquired, leading
to better collective decisions.
Under unanimity rule, one alternative is the status quo, which is chosen unless the other alterna-
tive receives every vote. Under this rule, we show that there are two types of Bayesian equilibrium,
both involving a cost cutoff. The first type is similar to the equilibrium described by Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998), and involves informed voters abstaining with some probability rather than
casting a vote for the status quo. The second type of equilibrium involves uninformed individuals
voting with some probability for the alternative disfavored by the rule. Intuitively, in either case
individuals attempt to counter the bias in the voting rule in favor of one alternative. Increasing the
size of the committee reduces the probability that a single individual acquires information, and,
in contrast to majority rule, leads to similar or possibly worse collective decisions. Comparing
behavior under different voting rules, individuals acquire less information and committees reach
worse decisions under unanimity rule than under majority rule.
We conducted laboratory experiments based on this model at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo
de México in Mexico City. The experiments involved four treatments, distinguished by committee
size (three or seven subjects) and voting rule (majority or unanimity). In all treatments, the value
of a correct decision, the informativeness of the signal, and the distribution of information costs
were held constant, in order to deliver sharp comparative static predictions.
Consistent with Bayesian equilibrium, we find that there is more information acquisition un-
der majority rule than under unanimity rule. Moreover, individuals seem to attempt to counter
the built-in bias in favor of the status quo under unanimity rule. Contradicting Bayesian predic-
tions, we find that uniformed individuals persistently cast votes—sometimes even in favor of the
alternative favored by the voting rule under unanimity. There is, in fact, substantial heterogeneity
in behavior, with some voters being very likely to acquire information, and preferring to abstain
while uninformed, and others being very unlikely to acquire information, and usually casting an
uninformed vote.
It is important to note that current behavioral theories would not account for the puzzling behav-
ior observed at the lab. “Cursed” voters (as defined by Eyster and Rabin 2005) would ignore the
informational content of other voters’ actions, and would be indifferent between abstaining or vot-
ing in case of being uninformed, so they could account for uninformed voting. But cursed voters
would be willing to acquire even more information, at higher costs, than voters who are not cursed
(Martinelli 2013). This contradicts our finding that voters acquire less information than standard
game theory predicts. “Loss aversion” (Kahneman and Tversky 1983) also fails to account for
our findings. While loss averse voters would be less willing than rational voters to acquire costly
information, as we observe, such voters would not be willing to vote if uninformed.
Motivated by the experimental results, we propose an alternative behavioral theory, subjective
beliefs equilibrium, which postulates that some individuals hold prior beliefs that are biased in
favor of one or the other alternative. Biased individuals can be interpreted as following their
own “hunches” or homemade priors to which they attribute informational content, even though—
in the spirit of agreeing to disagree—they are aware that some other individuals may not. We
characterize an equilibrium of this model, where the distribution of these non-common priors is
common knowledge among the voters.
As opposed to cursed equilibrium or loss aversion, subjective beliefs equilibria deliver predic-
tions that are consistent with the observed behavior at the lab. In particular, under either voting
rule, sufficiently biased individuals will vote without acquiring information. Moreover, compared
to the standard model without biased voters, the introduction of biased committee members makes
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unbiased committee members more willing to acquire information, but reduces the overall acqui-
sition of information and the probability of making the correct decision under either voting rule.
We use the experimental data to perform a structural estimation of a subjective beliefs equilib-
rium model with two parameters. The first parameter reflects the probability that a voter is a biased
type, while the second reflects a probability that a voter chooses a strategy by mistake. In the spirit
of quantal-response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998), individuals are assumed to
know that other voters make random errors. The estimated subjective beliefs equilibrium has an
excellent fit with the empirical distribution of strategies in the lab, yielding relatively similar pa-
rameters across treatments, namely the estimated probability that a voter is biased is about 40%
in three of the four treatments, and the probability that a voter makes a random mistake is about
20-25% in all treatments.
We then apply the results of our estimation to conduct a classification analysis of individual
subject behavior. Using a 95% confidence interval, 96% of individuals are classified as either
biased or unbiased. Again, we obtain that the probability that an individual is biased is 40%. The
similarity in the results across treatments is quite remarkable, given that the variation in voting
rules and committee sizes delivers very different equilibrium behavior.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. From the theoretical standpoint, Or-
deshook and Palfrey (1988), Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1997) first studied Bayesian equilibria of voting in committees with private information.
Mukhopadhaya (2005), Persico (2004), Martinelli (2006, 2007), and Gerardi and Yariv (2008) in-
troduced costly information acquisition in collective decision environments. Our theoretical model
differs from that literature in that we allow for abstention in a situation in which voters have het-
erogenous information costs, and we considers unanimity voting in addition to majority voting.
More importantly, we look beyond Bayesian equilibrium and introduce the notion of subjective
beliefs equilibrium.
In the experimental literature, Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000), Battaglini, Mor-
ton and Palfrey (2008, 2010), and Bhattacharya, Duffy and Kim (2013) have studed collective
decision situations with private information, and found some empirical support for Bayesian equi-
librium predictions. Goeree and Yariv (2010) find evidence that behavior under different voting
rules tracks theoretical predictions in the jury setting without communication. Two key features
distinguishing our work from the previous experiments in the literature are that voters have to
choose whether to acquire costly signals, and that the signals are not perfectly informative. These
two features seem to be responsible for the much further deviation from the predicted equilibrium
behavior in our environment. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental work
on information acquisition in committees, together with the work of Grosser and Seebauer (2013),
which originated independently from ours. Grosser and Seebauer observe similar patterns of be-
havior in terms of uninformed voting. Our work is different from theirs in that they focus on the
difference between compulsory and voluntary voting, while we attempt to explain the patters of
behavior under voluntary voting, and compare different voting rules. Furthermore, we propose a
new equilibrium model of heterogeneous types that explains the main features of the data and leads
to a sharp classification of individual behavior.
The notion of subjective beliefs equilibrium has a precedent in the experimental literature, intro-
duced as “homemade priors” in Camerer and Weigelt (1988) to explain deviations from sequential
equilibrium predictions in a reputation formation game. The random beliefs equilibrium concept,
introduced by Friedman and Mezzetti (2005) in the context of finite normal form games is also
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related to our definition, though in their case random beliefs occur with respect to others’ strategy
choices.
Outside the lab, of course, it is difficult to control the information that voters have prior to mak-
ing voting decisions, so it is generally very difficult to use field data regarding rational ignorance
and biased behavior. However, work by Caplan (2007), using a survey of opinions of economists
and citizens on the economy, is supportive of the hypothesis that public opinion is driven to some
extent by ignorance and willful biases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
and predictions. In this section, Bayesian equilibrium is treated as a special, extreme case of the
subjective beliefs equilibrium in which the distribution of priors is degenerate and gives probability
one to the unbiased priors. Section 3 explains the experimental design and hypotheses. Section 4
describes the experimental results and the structural estimation. Section 5 concludes. An appendix
provides a translation of experimental instructions.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Basics. We consider a committee with n≥ 2 members which must choose between two alter-
natives, A and B. There are two possible states of the world, ωA and ωB. Each committee member
receives a payoff of b > 0 if the committee reaches the decision A and the state of the world is
ωA, or if the committee reaches the decision B and the state of the world is ωB, and a payoff of 0
otherwise.
Both states of the world are equally likely, and committee members do not know which state ob-
tains. Each committee member, however, may choose to acquire some costly information. The cost
at which information may be acquired is independently and identically distributed across voters
according to a distribution function F , which is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable
over the interval [0,c] for some c > 0, with F(0) = 0, F ′(0) > 0, and F(c) = 1. After observing
their idiosyncratic cost of information acquisition, each committee member decides whether to pri-
vately acquire information or not. Each committee member who acquires information receives a
private signal s ∈ {sA,sB}. Conditional on the state of the world, private signals are independently
and identically distributed across voters. The probability or receiving signal sd in state ωd is equal
to 1/2+q for d ∈ {A,B}, where q ∈ (0,1/2].
After the information acquisition stage, the committee votes over the two alternatives. A com-
mittee member may vote for A, vote for B, or abstain. A voting rule,
V : {0, ...,n}×{0, ...,n}→ [0,1],
specifies a probability that the committee selects alternative A for any feasible combination of votes
for A and votes for B, with alternative B being selected by the committee with the complementary
probability. We consider two possible voting rules: simple majority and unanimity.
Under simple majority, VM, the alternative with most votes is chosen, with ties broken by a fair
coin toss. That is:
VM(vA,vB) =
 1 if v
A > vB
1/2 if vA = vB
0 if vA < vB
.
where vd denotes the number of votes for decision d.
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Under unanimity, VU , in our specification, A is chosen unless every vote that is cast favors B,
with A being chosen if every member abstains. That is:
VU(vA,vB) =
{
0 if vB > 0 = vA
1 otherwise .
Given a voter’s cost of information ci, the utility, Ui, of voter i net of information acquisition
costs is given by:
Ui =
{
b− ci if the decision is d and the state is ωd , for d ∈ {A,B}
−ci otherwise
if the voter acquires information. If voter i does not acquire information, then
Ui =
{
b if the decision is d and the state is ωd , for d ∈ {A,B}
0 otherwise .
2.2. Subjective beliefs equilibrium. We allow voters to hold privately noisy prior beliefs that
deviate from the correct prior probability of each state. In particular, each voter’s private belief
that the state of the world is ωA is 1/2+ ε, where ε is independently and identically distributed
across voters according to a distribution function M, symmetric around 0, such that M(ε) > 0 if
and only if ε>−β and M(ε) = 1 if and only if ε≥ β for some β ∈ [0,1/2]. Moreover, we assume
that for every κ > 0, M(κ)−M(−κ) > 0. That is, prior beliefs that are arbitrarily close to the
correct priors have positive probability.
A voter’s type is a triple t = (ε,c,s) specifying prior beliefs, the private cost of information
acquisition, and a private signal, where we denote "no signal" by s0. For a given voter, an action is
a pair a = (ι,v), ι ∈ {1,0}, v ∈ {A,B,φ}, indicating whether or not the voter acquires information
in the first stage, and whether the voter casts a vote for alternative A, for alternative B, or abstains
in the second stage.
A strategy for voter i is a pair of measurable mappings, σ = (σι,σv), where σι specifies the
information acquisition decision as a function of the voter’s type, and σv specifies the (possibly
mixed) voting decision as a function of the voter’s type. With slight abuse of terminology, we
denote by σ(a|t) = (σι(ι|t),σv(v|t)) the probability of action a = (ι,v) if the voter’s type is t.
We call a strategy informative if σι puts positive probability on the set of actions such that ι= 1,
and uninformative otherwise. A strategy profile is a vector (σ1, . . . ,σn) that assigns to each voter
i = 1, . . . ,n a strategy σi.
Given a strategy profile (σ1, . . . ,σn), let EUi(σ1, . . . ,σn|ωd) be the expected utility of voter i in
state ωd . Then the ε−subjective expected utility of voter i is equal to
(1/2+ ε)EUi(σ1, . . . ,σn|ωA)+(1/2− ε)EUi(σ1, . . . ,σn|ωB).
We say that σi is a subjective best response to the strategies of other voters if for almost every
realization ε of voter’s i prior beliefs, σi maximizes the ε−subjective expected utility of voter i.
A voter playing a subjective best-response realizes that other voters behavior is influenced by
their own noisy priors, but–in the spirit of agreeing to disagree–does not draw inferences from the
priors held by other voters. In particular, a voter playing a subjective best-response is not “cursed,”
since the voter recognizes that the behavior of other voters depends on the state of the world.
A subjective beliefs equilibrium is a strategy profile such that for each voter i, σi is a subjective
best response; that is, σi maximizes the subjective expected utility of voter i given the strategies
of other voters and given voter i’s prior beliefs about the states. We restrict attention to symmetric
informative equilibrium, where a symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium such that every voter
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uses the same strategy. Note that if β= 0, all voters have correct prior beliefs with probability one,
and the subjective equilibrium reduces to the standard Bayesian equilibrium for a common prior
belief of 1/2.
For any given voter, let x = (xA,xB,xφ) ∈N3 represent the vote profile of other voters, that is the
number of votes cast by other voters in favor of A, B, and abstention. From the perspective of each
voter, this is the realization of a random vector with a probability distribution that depends on the
strategy profile of other voters, the distribution of priors, and the state of the world. Given a voting
rule, a voter is decisive at x if the committee decision may be different depending on whether the
voter votes for A, B, or abstains. As it is well-understood, a best responding voter needs to be
concerned only with vote profiles such that the voter is decisive. We next characterize symmetric
informative equilibrium under simple majority and unanimity rules.
2.3. Simple majority. Under simple majority, a voter is decisive only if the difference between
the number of votes cast by other voters in favor of each of the alternatives is zero or one. In
particular, for a given voter i, let D(z|σ−i,ω) be the probability that the difference between the
number of votes for A and for B cast by other voters is equal to z when the strategy profile of other
voters is σ−i and the state of the world is ω. If the difference is zero, voting for one alternative
rather than abstaining increases the probability of that alternative winning the election from 1/2 to
1. If the difference is one, voting for the alternative that is behind rather than abstaining increases
the probability of that alternative winning the election from 0 to 1/2.
If the voter with prior ε acquires information, the difference in interim expected utility between
voting for A and abstaining after observing signal sA is:
GA(sA|ε,σ− j)≡ b2(12 + ε)(12 +q)(D(0|σ− j,ωA)+D(−1|σ− j,ωA))
− b2(12 − ε)(12 −q)(D(0|σ− j,ωB)+D(−1|σ− j,ωB))
Similarly, the difference in expected utility between voting for B and abstaining after observing
signal sB is:
GB(sB|ε,σ−i)≡−b2(12 + ε)(12 −q)(D(0|σ−i,ωA)+D(1|σ−i,ωA))
+ b2(
1
2 − ε)(12 +q)(D(0|σ−i,ωB)+D(1|σ−i,ωB)).
If the voter has not bought information, the difference in expected utility between voting for A
and abstaining is:
GA(s0|ε,σ−i)≡ b2(12 + ε)(D(0|σ−i,ωA)+D(−1|σ−i,ωA))
− b2(12 − ε)(D(0|σ−i,ωB)+D(−1|σ−i,ωB)).
Similarly, the difference in expected utility between voting for B and abstaining is
GB(s0|ε,σ−i)≡−b2(12 + ε)(D(0|σ−i,ωA)+D(1|σ−i,ωA))
+ b2(
1
2 − ε)(D(0|σ−i,ωB)+D(1|σ−i,ωB)).
It is never optimal for a voter to become informed and then vote against their signal. That is, if
a voter acquires information, the voter will either vote for A or abstain in case of receiving signal
sA, and either vote for B or abstain in case of receiving signal sB. Thus, the difference in expected
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utility between acquiring information and not, net of the cost of information acquisition, is
c(ε,σ−i)≡max{G(sA|ε,σ−i),G(sB|ε,σ−i),G(sA|ε,σ−i)+G(sB|ε,σ−i)}
−max{0,G(A|ε,σ−i),G(B|ε,σ−i)}.
From the preceding argument it follows that best-reply behavior has the familiar cutoff property:
given any strategy profile of other voters, a best-responding voter only acquires information if the
cost is below a well-defined cutoff value.
Lemma 1. Under majority rule, voter i with priors given by ε plays a best response to σ−i if for
almost every c,
(1) if c ≤ c(ε,σ−i) then the voter acquires information, and after signal sd votes for d if
G(sd|ε,σ−i)> 0 and abstains if G(sd|ε,σ−i)< 0,
(2) if c > c(ε,σ−i), then the voter does not acquire information, and votes for d only if
G(d|ε,σ−i) = max{0,G(A|ε,σ−i),G(B|ε,σ−i)} and abstains only if G(A|ε,σ−i) ≤ 0 and
G(B|ε,σ−i)≤ 0.
We say that a strategy σ is neutral if
σ((0,A)|(ε,c,sd)) = σ((0,B)|(−ε,c′,sd′))
for all d,d′ and almost all ε,c,c′, and
σ((1,A)|(ε,c,sA)) = σ((1,B)|(−ε,c′,sB))
and
σ((1,A)|(ε,c,sB)) = σ((1,B)|(−ε,c′,sA)) = 0
for almost all ε,c,c′. A voter who plays a neutral strategy does not discriminate between the
alternatives except on the basis of the private signal and prior beliefs, and does not vote for one
alternative if receiving a signal in favor of the other alternative. Given the assumption that the
distribution of ε is symmetric around 0, neutrality is a natural restriction under majority rule, since
the voting rule does not discriminate between the alternatives.
If every voter other than i plays a neutral strategy, it is straightforward that
D(0|σ−i,ωA) = D(0|σ−i,ωB)
and
D(1|σ−i,ωA) = D(−1|σ−i,ωB)≥ D(−1|σ−i,ωA) = D(1|σ−i,ωB),
where the inequality is strict if at least one player other than i plays an informative strategy. With
a slight abuse of notation, we now write
D(0|σ−i)≡ D(0|σ−i,ωA), D(1|σ−i)≡ D(1|σ−i,ωA) and D(−1|σ−i)≡ D(−1|σ−i,ωA)
to indicate the probability that the correct alternative is tied, one vote ahead or one vote behind
when all other voters are using neutral, informative strategies given by σ−i.
Then the expected gain equations derived above reduce to:
G(sA|ε,σ−i) = b2(q+ ε)D(0|σ−i)+ b2(12 + ε)(12 +q)D(−1|σ−i)− b2(12 − ε)(12 −q)D(1|σ−i),
G(sB|ε,σ−i) = b2(q− ε)D(0|σ−i)+ b2(12 − ε)(12 +q)D(−1|σ−i)− b2(12 + ε)(12 −q)D(1|σ−i),
G(A|ε,σ−i) = bεD(0|σ−i)+ b2(12 + ε)D(−1|σ−i)− b2(12 − ε)D(1|σ−i),
G(B|ε,σ−i) = −bεD(0|σ−i)+ b2(12 − ε)D(−1|σ−i)− b2(12 + ε)D(1|σ−i).
8 ELBITTAR, GOMBERG, MARTINELLI, AND PALFREY
The following lemma puts some bounds on what a voter can learn from being decisive, given
that other voters play neutral strategies. In particular, the ratio of the probability that the correct
alternative is ahead by one vote to the probability that the correct alternative is behind by one vote
is bounded below by one, and is bounded above by the informativeness of a single signal, that is
(1/2+q)/(1/2−q). This result is useful because it implies that if priors are not too biased, then
voters will prefer to abstain if uninformed and will prefer to vote according the signal received if
informed. The idea of the proof is to match every vote profile of other voters in which the correct
alternative is ahead by one vote with a vote profile in which the incorrect alternative is ahead by
one vote, by reversing a single vote cast in favor of the correct alternative. The proof itself is an
application of a theorem in graph theory that has been used in the analysis of networks but, to our
knowledge, never before in collective choice settings.
Lemma 2. If other voters are playing neutral strategies, then
1≤ D(1|σ−i)
D(−1|σ−i) ≤
1
2 +q
1
2 −q
,
where the lower bound is tight if and only if all other voters play uninformative strategies, and
the upper bound is tight if and only if all other voters play informative strategies and vote when
uninformed with probability zero.
Proof. Suppose voters other than i play neutral, informative strategies. From neutrality and sym-
metry of the distribution of ε, for each voter i′ 6= i the probability that the voter votes for A while
uninformed is equal to the probability that the voter votes for B while uninformed, and the prob-
ability that the voter votes for A after receiving signal sA is equal to the probability that the voter
votes for B after receiving signal sB, where these probabilities are calculated ex ante, taking into
account the strategy of voter i′ and the distribution of ε and c.
For each voter i′ 6= i, let pi(σi′) be the (ex ante) probability with which voter i′ acquires informa-
tion, ρ(σi′) the (ex ante) probability that the voter votes for alternative d after receiving signal sd ,
and τ(σi′) the (ex ante) probability that the voter votes for alternative d after not acquiring infor-
mation, for d = A,B. Let vr(σi′) and vw(σi′) be the probabilities that voter i′ votes for the correct
and the incorrect alternative, respectively. We have
vr(σ′i)
vw(σ′i)
=
pi(σi′)(12 +q)ρ(σi′)+(1−pi(σi′))τ(σi′)
pi(σi′)(12 −q)ρ(σi′)+(1−pi(σi′))τ(σi′)
.
Thus, for all i′ 6= i,
vr(σ′i)
vw(σ′i)
≥ 1,
with equality if and only if pi(σi′)ρ(σi′) = 0. Similarly, for all i′ 6= i,
vr(σ′i)
vw(σ′i)
≤
1
2 +q
1
2 −q
,
with equality if and only if (1−pi(σi′))τ(σi′) = 0.
Next, we claim that there exists a bijective mapping between the set of voting profiles such that
the correct alternative wins by one vote and voting profiles such that the incorrect alternative wins
by one vote, where only one voter needs to be switched from voting for the correct alternative
to voting for the incorrect alternative to go from the profile where the correct alternative wins to
the profile where the incorrect alternative wins. To see this, consider any subset of voters C ⊂
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{1, . . . ,n} \ {i} such that |C| is odd. Define RC to be the set of voting profiles such that voters
abstain if and only if they are not in C, and the correct alternative wins by one vote. Similarly,
define WC to be the set of voting profiles such that voters abstain if and only if they are not in C,
and the incorrect alternative wins by one vote.
Consider a graph where the vertices are the elements of RC∪WC, and the edges are
EC = {(r,w) ∈ RC×WC : r and w differ by the vote of a single individual} .
Note that every element of RC has (|C|+ 1)/2 edges incident to it, the same being true for every
element of WC. By Konig’s Marriage Theorem (see Theorem 2.5 in Balakrishnan 1995), there
exists a perfect matching MC, assigning to each voting profile in RC a voting profile in WC. Since
this is true for every C, there exists a bijective mapping
f : ∪CRC→∪CWC
given by f (r) = w such that (r,w) ∈MC for any r ∈ RC, and such that f assigns to each voting pro-
file r ∈ ∪CRC a unique profile f (r) ∈ ∪CWC where a single voter switches to the “mistaken” side.
Thus, the probability ratio between the two profiles is equal to the ratio between the probability of
that voter being right and that voter being wrong, which, as we have already established, must be
in the interval [1,(12 +q)/(
1
2 −q)]. Since, furthermore, D(1|σ−i) is the sum of the probabilities of
the voting profiles such that the correct alternative wins by one vote, and D(−1|σ−i) is the sum of
the probabilities of the voting profiles such that the incorrect alternative wins by one vote, the ratio
of D(1|σ−i) to D(−1|σ−i) is also in that interval. 
We now put to work Lemmas 1 and 2. We claim that if other voters play neutral strategies, a
best responding voter will play a neutral, informative strategy. To see this, assume all voters other
than i play neutral strategies. Using Lemma 2, we get that for small enough |ε|,
G(sA|ε,σ−i)> 0 and G(sB|ε,σ−i)> 0.
Suppose voters other than i play informative strategies. Then, from Lemma 2, D(1|σ−i) >
D(−1|σ−i). Thus, for small enough |ε|,
G(A|ε,σ−i)< 0 and G(B|ε,σ−i)< 0.
That is, if other voters play informative strategies, a voter with small enough deviation from cor-
rect priors abstains when uninformed, and votes according to the signal received when informed.
Moreover, from Lemma 1, the value of information for small enough |ε| is
c(ε,σ−i) = bqD(0|σ−i)+ b2(12 +q)D(−1|σ−i)− b2(12 −q)D(1|σ−i).(1)
From Lemma 2, c(ε,σ−i)> 0. That is, the cutoff for information acquisition is strictly positive for
small enough |ε| if other voters play informative strategies.
Suppose instead that voters other than i play uninformative strategies. Then from Lemma 2,
G(A|ε,σ−i)> 0 or G(B|ε,σ−i)> 0
for ε 6= 0. Since G(sA|ε,σ−i) > 0 and G(sB|ε,σ−i) > 0 for small enough |ε|, the voter will vote
according to priors when uninformed, and will vote according to the signal if informed. The value
of information for this voter, using Lemma 1, is then
c(ε,σ−i) = b(q−|ε|)
(
D(0|σ−i)+ 12D(−1|σ−i)+ 12D(1|σ−i)
)
.
Note that c2(ε,σ−i)> 0 if |ε|< q. That is, the cutoff for information acquisition is strictly positive
for small enough |ε| if other voters play uninformative strategies. Thus, a symmetric, neutral
equilibrium is necessarily informative.
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If β is small enough, equilibrium behavior can be very straightforward. To see this, recall that if
|ε| is small enough that the inequalities
G(sA|ε,σ−i)> 0, G(sB|ε,σ−i)> 0, G(A|ε,σ−i)< 0 and G(B|ε,σ−i)< 0
hold, then the voter will abstain when uninformed and will acquire information when c is below
the cutoff given by equation (1). Using Lemma 2 we get c(0,σ j) = bqD(0|σ j). In a symmetric
strategy profile in which every voter uses the same cutoff c∗ and abstains when uninformed, we get
that the probabilities of a vote for the correct and the incorrect alternatives are, respectively,
vr(σ∗) = F(c∗)(12 +q) and vw(σ
∗) = F(c∗)(12 −q).
Thus, the equilibrium cutoff must satisfy
(2) c∗ = bq
b(n−1)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2 j
)(
2 j
i
)
F(c∗)2 j(1−F(c∗))n−1−2 j (14 −q2) j .
Note that equation (2) always has a solution. To see this, suppose first that
c≤ bq
b(n−1)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2i
)(
2 j
j
)
F(c)2 j(1−F(c))n−1−2 j (14 −q2)i .
Since F(c) = 1, this is possible only if n is odd so that the inequality above becomes
c≤ bq
(
n−1
(n−1)/2
)
(1/4−q2)(n−1)/2.
Then c∗ = bq
( n−1
(n−1)/2
)
(1/4−q2)(n−1)/2 ≥ c is the unique solution to equation (2).
Suppose instead that
c > bq
b(n−1)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2 j
)(
2 j
j
)
F(c)2 j(1−F(c))n−1−2 j (14 −q2) j .
Using F ′(0)> 0, we have that that for c close enough to 0,
c < bq
b(n−1)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2 j
)(
2 j
j
)
F(c)2 j(1−F(c))n−1−2 j (14 −q2) j .
Existence of a solution satisfying 0 < c∗ < c follows from the intermediate value theorem.
Theorem 1 below completely characterizes symmetric, neutral equilibria corresponding to β= 0,
and shows that any such strategy profile remains an equilibrium profile for small deviations from
correct priors. In particular, under any such equilibrium profile voters abstain when uninformed
and acquire information and use it for small enough cost.
Theorem 1. Under majority tule,
(1) For any solution c∗ to equation (2), there is some β∗ ∈ (0,q) (depending on q,n,F,M) such
that if 0≤ β≤ β∗, a strategy profile is a symmetric, neutral, informative equilibrium if each
voter acquires information and votes according to the signal received if the voter’s cost is
below c∗ and abstains otherwise.
(2) If β= 0, there are no other symmetric, neutral equilibria.
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Proof. Under the strategy profile σ∗ described in the statement of the theorem, D(0|σ∗−i) > 0,
D(1|σ∗−i) > 0 and D(−1|σ∗−i) > 0. From Lemma 2, (12 − q)D(1|σ∗−i) = (12 + q)D(−1|σ∗−i). It
follows that G(sB|ε,σ∗−i) is positive at ε = 0 and is continuous and strictly decreasing in ε and
negative for large enough ε. Similarly, G(A|ε,σ∗−i) is negative at ε = 0 and is continuous and
strictly increasing in ε and positive for large enough ε. Let β∗ be the maximum value of ε such that
G(sB|ε,σ∗−i) ≥ 0 and G(A|ε,σ∗−i) ≤ 0. Using G(sA|ε,σ∗−i) = G(sB| − ε,σ∗−i) and G(B|ε,σ∗−i) =
G(A| − ε,σ∗−i), −β∗ is the minimum value of ε such that G(sA|ε,σ∗−i) ≥ 0 and G(B|ε,σ∗−i) ≤ 0.
From the argument preceding the theorem, σ∗ is a symmetric, neutral, informative equilibrium if
0≤ β≤ β∗.
For the second part of the theorem, note that
G(sA|0,σ−i) = G(sB|0,σ−i)> 0
for any neutral strategy profile of other voters. Similarly,
G(A|0,σ−i) = G(B|0,σ−i)≤ 0.
From Lemma 1, best responding voters play informative strategies. But then, in a symmetric
strategy profile
G(A|0,σ−i) = G(B|0,σ−i)< 0.
It follows that in a symmetric, neutral strategy profile voters abstain when uninformed and acquire
information and vote according to the signal received if the cost of information is below some
common threshold c∗ > 0. From the argument preceding the theorem, if this symmetric, neutral
strategy profile is an equilibrium then c∗ must be a solution to equation (2). 
For large deviations from correct priors, equilibrium behavior can be more complex and may
involve voting according to prior beliefs rather than acquiring information. We illustrate this below
with an example using parameters of our experiment.
2.4. An example under majority rule. Suppose b = 10, q = 1/6, c is distributed uniformly in
[0,1] and n = 3 or n = 7, and the rule is majority as in the lab experiments below. In addition,
suppose ε takes the value 0 with probability 1− p, the value−β with probability p/2 and the value
+β with probability p/2, for some β> 0 and p ∈ [0,1).
First, suppose p= 0, so all priors are at exactly 1/2, equation (2) has a unique solution for either
committee size, given by c∗ ≈ 0.5569 for n = 3, and by c∗ ≈ 0.3870 for n = 7. From Theorem
1, it follows that there is a unique symmetric, neutral Bayesian equilibrium in either case, and
that equilibrium behavior remains unaltered for small deviations from correct prior beliefs. The
probability of choosing the right alternative given the equilibrium with cutoff c∗ is given in either
case by
dn/2−1e
∑
j=0
n− j
∑
k= j+1
n!
j!k!(n− j− k)!(
1
2 +q)
k(12 −q) jF(c∗) j+k(1−F(c∗))n− j−k
+(1/2)
bn/2c
∑
j=0
n!
j! j!(n−2 j)!(
1
4 −q2) jF(c∗)2 j(1−F(c∗))n−2 j.
This probability is approximately 0.6650 for n = 3 and 0.7063 for n = 7.
Suppose now p > 0 and β is large enough for voters not to acquire information and vote for the
alternative favored by their prior beliefs rather than abstaining if ε= β,−β. Consider the strategy
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σc in which, if ε= 0, voters acquire information and vote according to the signal received if their
cost is below c, and abstain otherwise. In this case, the probability of abstention is
v0 = (1− p)(1− c),
the probability of voting for the right alternative is
vr = (1− p)c(12 +q)+ p2 ,
and the probability of voting for the wrong alternative is
vw = (1− p)c(12 −q)+ p2 .
Then
D(0|σc) =
b(n−1)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2 j
)(
2 j
j
)
(vr) j(vw) j(v0)n−2 j−1.
Similarly,
D(1|σc) =
b(n−3)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2 j+1
)(
2 j+1
j
)
(vr) j+1(vw) j(v0)n−2 j−2
and
D(−1|σc) =
b(n−3)/2c
∑
j=0
(
n−1
2 j+1
)(
2 j+1
j
)
(vr) j(vw) j+1(v0)n−2 j−2.
We can now calculate c by solving equation (1). We also need to check the inequality conditions
guaranteeing that biased voters do not acquire information and vote according to their bias. That
is, G(A|,β,σc)≥ 0 and G(sA|,β,σc)−G(A|,β,σc)≤ 0:
βD(0|σc)+ 12(12 +β)D(−1|σc)− 12(12 −β)D(1|σc)≥ 0,
(q−β)D(0|σc)− (12 +β)(12 −q)D(−1|σc)+(12 −β)(12 +q)D(1|σc)≤ 0.
Using Lemma 2, both equations are satisfied if β≥ 2q/(1+4q2).
As an example, suppose p = 1/2 and β = 3/10, so that the prior beliefs that the state of the
world is ωA are either 1/5, 1/2 or 4/5 with probability 1/4, 1/2 and 1/4, respectively. For n = 3,
we have c ≈ 0.76, so the probability of information acquisition is approximately 0.38. For n = 7
we get c≈ 0.48, so the probability of information acquisition is approximately 0.24.
Columns 3M and 7M of Table 1A, on experimental predictions, summarize the standard (p =
0) Bayesian equilibrium when all voters commonly share correct prior beliefs. Corresponding
columns in Table 1B summarize the subjective equilibrium with a trinomial distribution of prior
beliefs, when with probability 1/2 each voter has incorrect prior beliefs (p = 1/2). For either com-
mittee size, introducing deviations from correct priors reduces the unconditional probability of
information acquisition, even though it increases the probability of information acquisition condi-
tional on holding unbiased prior beliefs. Introducing deviations from correct priors also increases
the probability of uninformed voting, and reduces the probability of the group reaching the correct
decision.
The probability of information acquisition is decreasing in the committee size, both in the
Bayesian equilibrium and after introducing deviations from correct priors. In the former case,
however, the probability of reaching the correct decision in the size of the committee, while in the
latter it is decreasing. In fact, with seven subjects, after introducing biased individuals, collective
choice is no better than a coin toss.
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(A) Equilibrium for p = 0.0
Treatment (size, rule): 3M 7M 3U 7U
Predicted probabilities
of individual decisions
Info acquisition 0.56 0.39 0.46 0.44 0.25 0.22
Vote A if uninformed 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vote B if uninformed 0 0 0 [0.07,1] 0 [0.08,1]
Abstain if uninformed 1 1 1 [0,0.93] 1 [0,0.92]
Vote A if signal sA 1 1 0.5 1 0.45 1
Abstain if signal sA 0 0 0.5 0 0.55 0
Vote B if signal sB 1 1 1 1 1 1
Abstain if signal sB 0 0 0 0 0 0
Predicted probability
of group decision
Correct decision 0.67 0.71 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63
(B) Equilibrium for p = 0.5
Treatment (size, rule): 3M 7M 3U 7U
Predicted probabilities
of individual decisions
Info acquisition 0.38 0.24 0.22 0.08
Vote A if uninformed 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Vote B if uninformed 0.25 0.25 [0.25,0.75] [0.25,0.75]
Abstain if uninformed 0.50 0.50 [0,0.5] [0,0.5]
Vote A if signal sA 1 1 1 1
Abstain if signal sA 0 0 0 0
Vote B if signal sB 1 1 1 1
Abstain if signal sB 0 0 0 0
Predicted probability
of group decision
Correct decision 0.60 0.51 0.55 0.51
TABLE 1. Comparison of SBE with p = 0 and p = 0.5, for the experimental treatments.
2.5. Unanimity. Under unanimity, given our definition of this rule, a voter is decisive if and only
if either every other voter has abstained, or at least one voter has voted for B and no voter has voted
for A. In the former case, a vote for A or an abstention decide in favor of A and a vote for B decides
in favor of B. In the latter case, a vote for A decides in favor of A, and an abstention or a vote for B
decides in favor of B.
Let P(0|σ−i,ω) be the probability that all other voters abstain given the strategy profile σ−i of
other voters and the state of the world ω. Similarly, let P(1|σ−i,ω) be the probability that all other
voters abstain or vote for B and at least one other voter votes for B given the strategy profile σ−i of
other voters and the state of the world ω.
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If the voter with prior ε acquires information, the difference in interim expected utility between
voting for A and abstaining after observing signal sA is:
H(sA|ε,σ−i) = b(12 + ε)(12 +q)P(1|σ−i,ωA)−b(12 − ε)(12 −q)P(1|σ−i,ωB).
Similarly, the difference in expected utility between voting for B and abstaining after observing
signal sB is:
H(sB|ε,σ−i) =−b(12 + ε)(12 −q)P(0|σ−i,ωA)+b(12 − ε)(12 +q)P(0|σ−i,ωB).
If the voter did not acquire information, the difference in expected utility between voting for A
and abstaining is
H(A|ε,σ−i) = b(12 + ε)P(1|σ−i,ωA)−b(12 − ε)P(1|σ−i,ωB).
Finally, if the voter has not bought information, the difference in expected utility between voting
for B and abstaining is
H(B|ε,σ−i) =−b(12 + ε)P(0|σ−i,ωA)+b(12 − ε)P(0|σ−i,ωB).
As was the case with majority rule, it is easy to show that it is never optimal for a voter to
acquire information and then vote the opposite of the observed signal. Thus, the difference in
expected utility between acquiring information and not, net of the cost of information acquisition,
is
c(ε,σ−i)≡max{H(sA|ε,σ−i),H(sB|ε,σ−i),H(sA|ε,σ−i)+H(sB|ε,σ−i)}
−max{0,H(A|ε,σ−i),H(B|ε,σ−i)}.
From the preceding argument we obtain a result parallel to Lemma 1: given any strategy profile of
other voters, a best-responding voter only acquires information if the cost is low enough.
Lemma 3. Under unanimity rule, voter i with priors given by ε plays a best response to σ−i if for
almost every c,
(1) if c ≤ c(ε,σ−i) then the voter acquires information, and after signal sd votes for d if
H(sd|ε,σ−i)> 0 and abstains if H(sd|ε,σ−i)< 0,
(2) if c > c(ε,σ−i), then the voter does not acquire information, and votes for d only if
H(d|ε,σ−i) = max{0,H(A|ε,σ−i),H(B|ε,σ−i)} and abstains only if H(A|ε,σ−i) ≤ 0 and
H(B|ε,σ−i)≤ 0.
We next characterize symmetric, informative Bayesian equilibria, corresponding to β = 0. To
begin with, it is straightforward to check that there are no equilibria in which voters acquire infor-
mation with positive probability, vote according to the signal received, and abstain if uninformed
(this echoes the result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996). The reason is that, if other voters adopt
this strategy, H(sA|ε,σ−i) < 0, then the best response would be to abstain rather than vote for A
after signal sA. Similarly, there are no equilibria in which voters acquire information with positive
probability, vote for B after signal sB, and abstain otherwise. We show below that there is a mixed
strategy equilibrium in which voters randomize after signal sA.
Consider the strategy σc,y of acquiring information if the cost is below some c≥ 0, voting for A
with probability 1−y and abstaining with probability y after signal sA, voting for B after signal sB,
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and abstaining if uninformed. If every voter other than i follows this strategy we get
P(0|σc,y,ωA) = (1−F(c)+F(c)(12 +q)y)n−1,
P(0|σc,y,ωB) = (1−F(c)+F(c)(12 −q)y)n−1,
P(1|σc,y,ωA) = (1−F(c)(12 +q)(1− y))n−1− (1−F(c)+F(c)(12 +q)y)n−1,
P(1|σc,y,ωB) = (1−F(c)(12 −q)(1− y))n−1− (1−F(c)+F(c)(12 −q)y)n−1.
Note P(1|σc,y,ωA) ≤ P(1|σc,y,ωB) and P(0|σc,y,ωA) ≥ P(0|σc,y,ωB), implying H(A|0,σc,y) ≤ 0
and H(B|0,σc,y) ≤ 0, so that voters rather abstain than vote if uninformed and if other voters
follow a strategy σc,y. For σc,y to be a symmetric equilibrium strategy for c > 0 and 0 < y < 1, it
is necessary and sufficient that
c =−b2(12 −q)P(0|σc,y,ωA)+ b2(12 +q)P(0|σc,y,ωB)> 0(3)
and
P(1|σc,y,ωA)
P(1|σc,y,ωB) =
1
2 −q
1
2 +q
.(4)
Equation (4) implies that H(sA|0,σc,y) = 0, so that voters are willing to randomize between absten-
tion and voting for A after receiving signal sA. Equation (3) follows from c(0,σc,y) =H(sB|0,σc,y),
and the inequality implies that voters are willing to vote for B after receiving signal sB. To ver-
ify that equations (3) and (4) have a solution (not necessarily unique), one shows that for every
0 ≤ F(c) ≤ 1 there is some 0 < y < 1 such that the pair (c,y) solves equation (3). Similarly, for
every 0≤ y≤ 1 there is some 0 < c < c such that (c,y) solves equation (4). Existence of an interior
solution to both equations follows from a standard fixed point argument.
There may be symmetric, informative Bayesian equilibria other than the one described above.
In particular, consider the strategy σ˜c,z of acquiring information if the cost is below some c ≥ 0,
voting for A if receiving the signal sA, voting for B if receiving the signal sB, and abstaining with
probability z and voting for B with probability 1− z when uninformed. If every voter other than i
follows this strategy we get
P(0|σ˜c,z,ωA) = (1−F(c))n−1zn−1,
P(0|σ˜c,z,ωB) = (1−F(c))n−1zn−1,
P(1|σ˜c,z,ωA) = (1−F(c)(12 +q))n−1− (1−F(c))n−1zn−1,
P(1|σ˜c,z,ωB) = (1−F(c)(12 −q))n−1− (1−F(c))n−1zn−1.
Note P(0|σ˜c,z,ωA) = P(0|σ˜c,z,ωB) and P(1|σ˜c,z,ωA) ≤ P(1|σ˜c,z,ωB), implying H(B|0, σ˜c,z) = 0,
H(sB|0, σ˜c,z) ≥ 0 and H(A|0, σ˜c,z) ≤ 0. For σ˜c,z to be a symmetric equilibrium strategy for c > 0
and 0 < z≤ 1, it is necessary and sufficient that
c = b2(
1
2 +q)
[
1−F(c)(12 +q)
]n−1− b2(12 −q)[1−F(c)(12 −q)]n−1(5)
and
0≤ z≤ (c/bq) 1n−1/(1−F(c)).(6)
Equation (5) implies c = H(sA|0, σ˜c,z)+H(sB|0, σ˜c,z) (satisfying Lemma 3), and equation (6) im-
plies
P(1|σ˜c,z,ωA)
P(1|σ˜c,z,ωB) ≥
1
2 −q
1
2 +q
,
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so that H(sA|0, σ˜c,z)≥ 0. It is straightforward to check that equation 5 has a solution c∗ ∈ (0,c).
We have
Theorem 2. Under unanimity rule, if β= 0,
(1) For any solution (c,y) to equations (3) and (4), there is a symmetric, informative equi-
librium, in which each voter acquires information if the voter’s cost is below c, votes for
B after receiving signal sB, votes for A with probability y after receiving signal sA, and
abstains otherwise.
(2) For any solution (c,z) to equations (5) and (6), there is a symmetric, informative equilib-
rium, in which each voter acquires information if the voter’s cost is below c, votes for A
after receiving signal sA, abstains with probability z if uninformed, and votes for B other-
wise.
(3) There are no other symmetric, informative equilibria.
Proof. The first and second parts of the theorem are proved in the text. With respect to the third
part, it is straightforward to check that, in a symmetric strategy profile, H(sB|0,σ j) ≤ 0 implies
that best-responding voters who receive a signal sA abstain with positive probability, which in turn
implies H(sA|0,σ j)≤ 0. Thus, there is no informative equilibrium strategy such that H(sB|0,σ j)≤
0. Similarly, H(sA|0,σ j) < 0 implies that best-responding voters who receive a signal sA do not
vote for A, which in turn implies H(sA|0,σ j) > 0, a contradiction. Thus, there is no informative
equilibrium strategy such that H(sA|0,σ j)< 0.
Next, H(sB|0,σ j) > 0 and H(sA|0,σ j) > 0 imply that best-responding voters vote according to
the signal received, which in turn implies H(sA|0,σ j) < 0, unless uninformed voters vote for B
with positive probability, corresponding to equilibria described in the second part of the theorem.
The only remaining possibility is H(sB|0,σ j)> 0 and H(sA|0,σ j) = 0, corresponding to equilibria
described in the first and second parts of the theorem. 
Theorem 2 shows that there are multiple symmetric, informative Bayesian equilibria under una-
nimity rule when β = 0, involving either abstaining when receiving a signal favoring the status
quo, or voting against the status quo when uninformed. For β > 0, however, equilibrium may in-
volve voting according to prior beliefs rather than acquiring information. This, in turn, may make
it a best response for unbiased voters to vote according to the signal received and to abstain if
uninformed. We illustrate this point below, continuing the example from the majority rule section.
2.6. An example under unanimity rule. Suppose b = 10, q = 1/6, c is distributed uniformly in
[0,1] and n = 3 or n = 7, and the rule is unanimity as in the lab experiments below. In addition,
suppose ε takes the value 0 with probability 1− p, the value−β with probability p/2 and the value
+β with probability p/2, for some β> 0 and p ∈ [0,1).
A symmetric, informative Bayesian equilibrium strategy can be calculated solving equations (3)
and (4) or equivalently
c =−53(1− c+ 23cy)n−1+ 103 (1− c+ 13cy)n−1
and
(1− 23c(1− y))n−1− (1− c+ 23cy)n−1
(1− 13c(1− y))n−1− (1− c+ 13cy)n−1
= 12 .
The probability of reaching the correct decision is given by
1
2
[
1− (1− 23c(1− y))n+(1− c+ 23cy)n
]
+ 12
[
(1− c(1− y)/3)n− (1− c+ 13cy)n
]
;
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solutions for n = 3 and n = 7 are given by the left column corresponding to the treatments 3U and
7U in Table 1A on experimental predictions.
Other symmetric, informative Bayesian equilibria can be calculated solving equations (5) and
(6), or equivalently
c = 103 (1− 23c)n−1− 53(1− 13c)n−1
and
0≤ z≤ (35c)
1
n−1/(1− c).
The probability of reaching the correct decision is given by
1
2(1− (1− 23c)n)+ 12(1− 13c)n;
solutions for n= 3 and n= 7 are given by the right column corresponding to the treatments 3U and
7U in Table 1A. The column to the left under each of the unanimity treatments corresponds to the
equilibrium in which voters randomize after receiving a signal favoring the status quo, while the
column to the right corresponds to the equilibria in which voters randomize when uninformed. In
the latter case, there is an interval of equilibrium mixed strategies, which is indicated with square
brackets.
Suppose now β is large enough for voters not to acquire information and vote for the alternative
favored by their prior beliefs rather than abstaining when ε = β,−β. In this case, in a symmetric
strategy profile in which unbiased voters vote according to the signal received, and abstain with
probability z and vote for B with probability 1− z if uninformed,
P(0|σ−i,ωA) = (1− p)n−1(1− c)n−1zn−1,
P(0|σ−i,ωB) = (1− p)n−1(1− c)n−1zn−1,
P(1|σ−i,ωA) = (12 p+(1− p)(1− 23c))n−1− (1− p)n−1(1− c)n−1zn−1,
P(1|σ−i,ωB) = (12 p+(1− p)(1− 13c))n−1− (1− p)n−1(1− c)n−1zn−1.
Thus, using c(0,σ−i) = H(sA|0,σ−i)+H(sB|0,σ−i),
c = 103 (
1
2 p+(1− p)(1− 23c))n−1− 53(12 p+(1− p)(1− 13c))n−1.
We need to check
(12 p+(1− p)(1− 23c))n−1− (1− p)n−1(1− c)n−1zn−1
(12 p+(1− p)(1− 13c))n−1− (1− p)n−1(1− c)n−1zn−1
> 12 ,
so that unbiased voters are willing to vote for A after signal sA, and
β≥ 12 max
{
P(1|σ−i,ωB)−P(1|σ−i,ωA)
P(1|σ−i,ωA)+P(1|σ−i,ωB) ,
2P(1|σ−i,ωA)−P(1|σ−i,ωB)
2P(1|σ−i,ωA)+P(1|σ−i,ωB)
}
,
so that voters with biased priors do not acquire information and vote according to their prior. The
probability of reaching the correct decision is equal to
1
2
[
1− (12 p+(1− p)(1− 23c))n
]
+ 12
[
(12 p+(1− p)(1− 13c))n
]
.
In particular, for p= 1/2, we get that for n= 3, c≈ 0.4452, so that the probability of information
acquisition is near 0.2226, and the various inequalities are satisfied for β > 0.1406. For n =
7, c ≈ 0.1500, so that the probability of information acquisition is near 0.0750, and the various
inequalities are satisfied for 0≤ z≤ 1 and β> 0.1241. Table 1B illustrates the solution for p= 1/2.
Under unanimity rule, there is a range of equilibrium mixtures between abstention and voting
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against the status quo if uninformed that are consistent with equilibrium behavior, as indicated by
the square brackets, but there is no longer an equilibrium in which voters randomize after receiving
a signal in favor of the status quo.
For either committee size, Bayesian equilibria require either voters abstaining with positive
probability when receiving a signal favoring sA or voting for B with positive probability when
uninformed. Introducing voters with extreme prior beliefs induces voters with correct priors to
vote with their signals if informed and also reduces the probability of the group reaching the correct
decision.
Increasing the size of the committee reduces information acquisition both in the Bayesian equi-
librium and the subjective equilibrium with extreme prior voters; the theoretical effect of group size
on the probability of the group reaching the correct decision is negligible under unanimity rule. As
in the case of majority, with seven subjects, after introducing biased individuals, collective choice
is barely better than a coin toss.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
3.1. Experimental design. The design of our experiment was guided by the comparative statics
implications of the standard Bayesian equilibrium with p = 0. While there are several dimensions
of the model that yield clear comparative statics, we focus on two: the number of voters (n = 3 or
n = 7) and the decision rule (VM or VU ). In all treatments, the value of a correct decision, b, and
the informativeness of the signal, q, were held constant, as was the distribution of signal costs. The
design also allows us to explore the influence of subjective beliefs on behavior. In particular, we
use the data from the experiment to estimate the parameters of our subjective beliefs equilibrium
model in order to measure the extent of this phenomenon.
The procedures and framing of the experiment were based on the Condorcet jury “jar” interface
introduced by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) and adapted by Battaglini et al. (2008, 2010) in their
initial laboratory studies of the swing voter’s curse. The two states of the world are represented as
two jars, a red jar and a blue jar. The game proceeds as follows. First, either the master computer
or a subject-monitor tosses a fair coin to determine the state of the world (i.e., selects the jar). The
red jar contains 8 red balls and 4 blue balls, and the blue jar contains a 8 blue balls and 4 red
balls, in order to induce a signal informativeness of q = 1/6. The red jar corresponds to state B
and the blue jar corresponds to state A in the theoretical model. This labeling only matters for the
unanimity committees, where decision A is the status quo.
Each committee member i was assigned an integer-valued signal cost, ci, drawn from a com-
monly known uniform distribution over 1, ...,100. Then each committee member, acting indepen-
dently of other committee members, could choose to pay their signal cost in order to privately
observe the color of exactly one of the balls randomly drawn from the jar. The randomization was
done as follows. A jar appears on the subject screen with 12 balls inside it, with 8 of them one
color and 4 of them the other color. The locations of the 12 balls are randomly shuffled on each
screen and the colors are greyed out. If a subject pays his or her signal cost, the computer prompts
them to click on one of the greyed-out balls, which then reveals the color of that ball. In case they
chose not to pay the cost, they do nothing at this point.
Once all subjects selected a ball or indicated their choice not to do so, each committee member
is given three choices: vote for Red; vote for Blue; or Abstain. At no time was any communication
between the subjects allowed, so both the information (or lack thereof) and vote decisions remained
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private until all the votes were cast, at which point only the votes were announced, and the com-
mittee decision was implemented according to the voting rule (either majority, or unanimity with
Red as the status quo).
If the committee choice was correct (i.e. the committee voted for the same color as the plurality
of the balls in the jar) each committee member received a payoff of 1000, less whatever the private
cost incurred for observing the color of a ball. If the decision was wrong (i.e. the color chosen by
the committee and the color of the plurality of the balls in the jar did not coincide), each committee
member received a payoff of 0 and still had to pay the private cost of acquiring information, if any
had been incurred.
Each committee decision, as described above, constituted a single experimental round, upon
completion of which committees were randomly re-matched and new jars and private observation
costs were drawn independently from the previous rounds. Detailed instructions were read aloud
before the experiment began. A translated copy of these instructions is provided in the Appendix.
Figure 4 in the Appendix presents a sample of the computer screen as it appeared to subjects after
they observed the color of a ball. In case they chose not to observe, the screen would be identical,
except that all balls would appear grey.
All experimental sessions (generally involving 21 subjects each, except for one 15-subject ses-
sion with 3-member committees deciding by majority rule) consisted of 25 rounds of the same
treatment with random re-matching between rounds, and were conducted at ITAM in Mexico City
with student subjects recruited from introductory economics courses. At the end of each session
each subject was paid the sum of their earnings across all rounds, in cash, using the exchange rate
of 1000 points to 8 Mexican pesos (rounded to the nearest peso) plus 20 pesos as a show-up fee.
Average earnings, including the show-up fee, were 133 pesos for M3, 141 pesos for M7, 125 pesos
for U3, and 127 pesos for U7. (At the time of the experiment, 1 US dollar was worth around 12
pesos.) Each session lasted approximately one hour.
3.2. Hypotheses. As described earlier, Table 1A summarizes equilibrium strategies and probabil-
ity of a correct group decision for the standard (p = 0) Bayesian equilibria of the four treatments,
7M, 7M, 3U, and 7U. As explained in the theory section, there are multiple Bayesian equilibria
under unanimity rule. The column to the left under each of the unanimity treatments corresponds
to the equilibrium in which voters randomize after receiving a signal favoring the status quo, while
the column to the right corresponds to the equilibria in which voters randomize when uninformed.
Based on Table 1A, we summarize the main hypotheses below:
(H1) Under both voting rules, members of smaller committees acquire more information.
(H2) For both committee sizes, members of majority rule committees acquire more information
than members of unanimity rule committees.
(H3) Under majority rule, committee members who do not acquire information abstain.
(H4) Under unanimity rule, committee members who do not acquire information abstain or vote
for B.
(H5) Under both voting rules, committee members who acquire information never vote against
their signal.
(H6) Under majority rule, committee members who acquire information vote their signal.
(H7) Under unanimity rule, committee members who acquire information and receive a B signal
vote for B.
(H8) Under unanimity rule, committee members who receive an A signal vote for A or abstain.
(H9) With majority rule, larger committees make better decisions.
(H10) Majority committees make better decisions than unanimity committees.
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4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We first present some summary statistics that provide a simple test of the comparative static
predictions of the baseline model with respect to treatment effects, as detailed in Table 1A of the
previous section. We then present estimation results, using a structural approach to estimate the
parameters of the subjective belief equilibrium model. In the last section, we take a close look at
individual behavior, and use those estimates to classify individual subject behavior.
4.1. Treatment effects. Table 2 summarizes treatment effects.
4.1.1. Information Acquisition (H1 - H2). With respect to the frequency of information acquisi-
tion, there are three notable observations. First, there is no significant effect of committee size on
information acquisition. Because the baseline theory predicts a large effect of committee size on
information acquisition (H1), this finding is surprising. Also note that the lack of a statistically sig-
nificant effect of the committee size is not just an artifact of large standard errors. Quantitatively,
the average effect of committee size is precisely zero (to two decimal places) for both voting rules.
Second, consistent with H2, there is more information acquisition under majority rule than under
unanimity rule. The size of this effect is the same for both committee sizes; in both cases, there
is about 20% more information acquisition under majority rule than under unanimity. This per-
centage difference is somewhat higher than predicted by theory, although the raw difference in
information acquisition (0.06) close to the theory. Third, we observe significantly less information
acquisition than predicted, except for unanimity committees with seven members. The magni-
tude of this difference is large for committees with three members, where we observe 50% less
information acquisition than predicted.
4.1.2. Voting Behavior (H3 - H8). With respect to the voting frequency, the most striking obser-
vation from Table 2 is the amount of voting by uninformed voters, which strongly contradicts H3.
In the majority treatments, participation by uninformed voters exceeds 60%, while the baseline
theory predicts zero turnout. This is strikingly different from the finding in the swing voter’s curse
experiments by Battaglini et al. (2008, 2010), where under majority rule, uninformed voters ab-
stained nearly all the time when the two states were equally likely. We discuss this finding more
in the concluding section. In the unanimity treatments, uninformed voting in favor of the status
quo exceeds 20%, while the baseline theory predicts zero, contradicting H4. Uninformed voting in
favor of either alternative under majority rule, as well as uninformed voting in favor of the status
quo decline with committee size.
A second observation regarding voting frequency is that informed voters almost never vote
against their signal, which is consistent with H5 and with past findings.
A third observation is that we observe significant levels of abstention among informed voters
only in the case of voters who obtain a signal favoring the status quo under unanimity rule. The
level of abstention is small, and informed voters do tend to vote according to the signal received.
This supports hypotheses H6, H7, and H8.
4.1.3. Group decision accuracy (H9 - H10). With respect to the frequency of correct group deci-
sions, the effect of group size is negligible for both voting rules, which is consistent with the theory
for the unanimity committees, but contradicts H9. We do observe that the probability of correct
decisions is higher under majority rule than under unanimity rule, which supports H10.
To summarize, we find support for the qualitative hypotheses H2, H5, H6, H7, H8, and H10.
The failure of H3 and H4 goes in line with the predictions of the subjective beliefs model with
p > 0, to which we turn our attention now.
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Treatment (size, rule): 3M 7M 3U 7U
Observed frequencies
of individual decisions
Info acquisition 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.27
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Vote A if uninformed 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.20
Vote B if uninformed 0.37 0.28 0.35 0.35
Abstain if uninformed 0.24 0.39 0.37 0.45
Vote A if signal sA 0.96 0.96 0.80 0.82
Vote B if signal sA 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03
Abstain if signal sA 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.15
Vote A if signal sB 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00
Vote B if signal sB 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.89
Abstain if signal sB 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.02
Observed frequency
of group decision
Correct decision 0.60 0.63 0.56 0.56
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
TABLE 2. Summary of experimental data. Standard errors in parenthesis treat each
individual’s 25 decisions as as a single observation. The unit observation for a
committee decision is one committee.
4.2. Structural estimation of the subjective beliefs equilibrium model. There are several key
features of observed behavior that are consistent with the subjective beliefs equilibrium model
with p > 0 but were not predicted by the standard model with p = 0. First, many subjects usually
vote when uninformed. Second, subjects acquire information much less frequently than predicted.
Third, informed voters usually vote their signal. These features are commonly shared across all
four treatments. With this in mind, we perform a maximum likelihood estimation of a version of
the subjective beliefs equilibrium model.
As in the examples in the theory section, we assume that each subject is unbiased with prob-
ability 1− p and biased with probability p. Unbiased subjects’ prior belief that the state of the
world is ωA is 1/2, while each biased subject’s prior belief that the state of the world is ωA is equal
to 1/2−β with probability 1/2 and equal to 1/2+β with probability 1/2, where p ∈ [0,1] and
β ∈ [0,1/2]. We assume that player types are persistent, so that unbiased subjects hold objective
priors for all rounds of the experiment, while biased subjects draw a new subjective prior every
round. 1 With respect to the parameter β, we assume in the estimation that it is sufficiently high so
that biased subjects prefer not to acquire information and simply vote their hunch, as explained in
the theory section.
The model as described so far is too deterministic for estimation purposes. For example, in
the subjective beliefs equilibrium model, no subject will ever become informed and then vote
against the signal received, but we do observe such behavior occasionally in the data. To avoid
this zero-likelihood problem, we assume that, in each round, each subject plays the equilibrium
1Treating subjects as persistent types in this way does not change the equilibrium strategies derived in the theory
section.
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strategy with probability Q, and chooses an action randomly with probability 1−Q. In the spirit
of quantal response equilibrium, we assume that subjects are aware that other subjects, as well as
themselves, make a mistake with probability 1−Q. These leaves two parameters to be identified:
the probability of a subject being biased, p, and the probability of playing an equilibrium strategy,
Q.
To simplify the estimation, we blind ourselves to the actual cost draws of subjects. Thus, there
are nine possible sequences of actions for a given subject in a period that are relevant for the
estimation, given by the signal observed by the voter and the vote cast.
(AA) Acquires information, draws signal sA, and votes for A.
(AB) Acquires information, draws signal sA, and votes for B.
(Aφ) Acquires information, draws signal sA, and abstains.
(BA) Acquires information, draws signal sB, and votes for A.
(BB) Acquires information, draws signal sB, and votes for B.
(Bφ) Acquires information, draws signal sB, and abstains.
(φA) Does not acquires information, and votes for A.
(φB) Does not acquires information, and votes for B.
(φφ) Does not acquires information, and abstains.
We assume that, if subjects make a mistake, they randomize at each stage uniformly. That is,
they become informed with probability 1/2, and they vote for A, for B, or abstain, with probability
1/3 regardless of whether they are informed or not, and regardless of the signal received. Since
the unconditional probability of receiving either signal is 1/2, each of the six action sequences,
AA,AB,Aφ,BA,BB, and Bφ, will occur with probability 1/12, and each of the three sequences, φA,
φB and φφ, will occur with probability 1/6.
4.2.1. Likelihood function for majority rule. The likelihood function is constructed as follows.
Denote the number of times subject i took each of the nine action sequences as kisv, where
sv ∈ {AA,AB,Aφ,BA,BB,Bφ,φA,φB,φφ}.
Our data for subject i is simply i’s profile of actions, Di = (kisv). For any pair of parameters, (p,Q),
and for group size n, the majority rule likelihood of Di is given by:
LM(Di|p,Q,n) = p
{
[(12Q+
1
6(1−Q)]k
i
φA+k
i
φB[16(1−Q)]k
i
φφ[ 112(1−Q)]k
i
AA+k
i
BB+k
i
AB+k
i
Aφ+k
i
BA+k
i
Bφ
}
+(1− p)
{
[12 ι
∗
M(p,Q,n)Q+
1
12(1−Q)]k
i
AA+k
i
BB[(1− ι∗M(p,Q,n))Q+ 16(1−Q)]k
i
φφ
[16(1−Q)]k
i
φA+k
i
φB [ 112(1−Q)]k
i
AB+k
i
Aφ+k
i
BA+k
i
Bφ
}
where ι∗M(p,Q,n) is the equilibrium probability that an unbiased voter buys information and then
votes according to the signal received in the subjective beliefs equilibrium model if the model
parameters are (p,Q) and the committee size is n, using majority rule. The first term in the right-
hand side corresponds to the event that subject i is biased, which happens with probability p. In
that case, the subject intends not to acquire information and vote for A with probability 1/2, and
not to acquire information and vote for B with probability 1/2, depending on the realization of
the subject’s bias. The subject does as intended with probability Q, and makes a mistake with
probability 1−Q, in which case the subject does not acquire information and votes for A with
probability 1/6, and similarly for B. Thus, the expression [12Q+
1
6(1−Q)] in the first term is equal
to the probability that a biased subject does not acquire information and votes for A, and equal to
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the probability that a biased subject does not acquire information and votes for B. Other terms can
be explained similarly.
Using equation (1), we have
ι∗M(p,Q,n) = (5/3)D(0|p,Q,n)+(10/3)D(−1|p,Q,n)− (5/3)D(1|p,Q,n),
where
D(0|p,Q,n) =
b(n−1)/2c
∑
i=0
(
n−1
2i
)(
2i
i
)
(vr)i(vw)i(v0)n−2i−1,
D(1|p,Q,n) =
b(n−3)/2c
∑
i=0
(
n−1
2i+1
)(
2i+1
i
)
(vr)i+1(vw)i(v0)n−2i−2,
D(−1|p,Q,n) =
b(n−3)/2c
∑
i=0
(
n−1
2i+1
)(
2i+1
i
)
(vr)i(vw)i+1(v0)n−2i−2
and
v0 = (1− p)(1− ι∗M(p,Q,n))Q+ 13(1−Q),
vr = 23(1− p)ι∗M(p,Q,n)Q+ p2 Q+ 13(1−Q),
vw = 13(1− p)ι∗M(p,Q,n)Q+ p2 Q+ 13(1−Q).
The log likelihood function is equal to the sum of logLM(Di|p,Q,n) across all the individuals
in the sample. The estimation is then done by using Matlab to find the values of p and Q that
maximize the log likelihood function.
4.2.2. Likelihood function for unanimity rule. The expression for the likelihood of Di with una-
nimity is based on the equilibrium described in the last two columns of Table 2B. For any pair of
parameters, (p,Q), and for group size n, the unanimity rule likelihood of Di is given by:
LU(Di|p,Q,n) = p
{
[(12Q+
1
6(1−Q)]k
i
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i
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.
where ι∗U(p,Q,n) is the equilibrium probability that an unbiased voter buys information and then
votes according to the signal received in the subjective beliefs equilibrium model, if the model
parameters are (p,Q) and the committee size is n, using unanimity rule. This expression is similar
to the one for majority, except for how it deals with the probability that an unbiased subject does not
get information and abstains, and the probability that an unbiased subject does not get information
and votes for B. The reason is that under unanimity rule, for our parameter values, even for
very small values of p, unbiased, uninformed voters can randomize in any way between voting
for B and abstaining. We assume that such voters randomize with equal probability. Thus, the
expression [12(1− ι∗U(p,Q,n))Q+ 16(1−Q)] is equal to the probability that an unbiased subject
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Treatment Observations p̂ Q̂ − lnL
3M 1950 0.41 0.76 2889
7M 1554 0.45 0.76 2329
3U 1575 0.41 0.75 2497
7U 1575 0.10 0.78 2539
Pooled except 7U 5079 0.42 0.76 7716
All pooled 6654 0.30 0.76 10282
TABLE 3. Estimation results for subject beliefs equilibrium model
does not acquire information and abstains, and is equal to the probability that an unbiased subject
does not acquire information and votes for B.2
Using equation (5), we have
ι∗U(p,Q,n) = (10/3)(1− vr)n−1− (5/3)(1− vw)n−1,
where
vr = 23(1− p)ι∗U(p,Q,n)Q+ p2 Q+ 13(1−Q),
vw = 13(1− p)ι∗U(p,Q,n)Q+ p2 Q+ 13(1−Q).
4.2.3. Estimation results. Table 3 reports the maximum likelihood estimates ( p̂, Q̂). We report
these estimates at two levels of aggregation:
(a) a separate estimate for each of the four treatments;
(b) an estimate for all treatments except 7U combined;
(c) an estimate for all treatments combined.
Table 3 also reports the number of observations, which is simply the number of subjects in each
treatment times 25. Recall that for each subject we have a panel of 25 observations, each observa-
tion consisting of one of the nine possible pairs of actions listed above.3
The estimated values ( p̂, Q̂) are very similar for the majority treatments and for the unanimity
treatment with three member committees, with the proportion of biased subjects being approx-
imately 40%, and error rates in the range of 24% to 25%. In fact, these three treatments are
statistically indistinguishable, based on a chi-square test of the difference between the pooled log
likelihood and the sum of the three separately estimated log likelihoods.
The estimated error rate for the 7U treatment is about the same (22%) as the other treatments,
but the estimated proportion of biased subjects is much lower (10% compared to 41%). This is
the only of our treatments where we observe too much information acquisition. For example,
when p = 1/2, the equilibrium probability of information acquisition in the 7U treatment is only
0.08, which is far below the observed frequency information acquisition of 0.27. To account for
the observed frequency of information acquisition, the estimated model predicts that 90% of the
subjects are unbiased. This however, leads to an estimated probability of voting for the status quo
2We also explored an alternative estimation model that included an additional parameter for the probability an un-
informed unbiased voter votes for B. That less parsimonious specification improves the fit somewhat, but leaves the
estimates of p and Q unchanged.
3An exception is one of the majority sessions with seven member committees, where we have only 24 observations
for each subject.
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Treatment %I AA AB Aφ BA BB Bφ φA φB φφ
3M model 0.45 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.20 0.20 0.15data 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.25 0.26 0.16
7M model 0.33 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.25data 0.33 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.26
3U model 0.34 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.20 0.31 0.16data 0.27 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.21 0.25 0.27
7U model 0.26 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.35 0.31data 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.25 0.32
TABLE 4. Comparison of action frequencies: estimated model vs. data
Estimated model Data
Treatment (size, rule): 3M 7M 3U 7U 3M 7M 3U 7U
Predicted probabilities
of individual decisions
Info acquisition 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.27
Vote A if uninformed 0.36 0.31 0.30 0.10 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.20
Vote B if uninformed 0.36 0.31 0.47 0.48 0.37 0.28 0.35 0.35
Abstain if uninformed 0.28 0.37 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.39 0.37 0.45
Vote A if signal sA 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.96 0.96 0.80 0.82
Vote B if signal sA 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03
Abstain if signal sA 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.15
Vote A if signal sB 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00
Vote B if signal sB 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.89
Abstain if signal sB 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.02
Predicted probability
of group decision
Correct decision 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.56 0.56
TABLE 5. Estimated model predictions vs. data
if uninformed that is half of what is observed in the data. A conjecture to explain the relatively
high frequency of information acquisition is that, for 7U treatments, acquiring information above
the best response cutoff is practically costless, so that in fact the fraction of unbiased subjects is
similar to that in other treatments, but these individuals are doing more information acquisition
than predicted by best response behavior.
Table 4 displays the fitted action probabilities corresponding to separate estimates for each treat-
ment, and compares them to the frequencies observed in the data. Column 3 displays the percent
of informed individuals, denoted %I. The predicted value for percent informed for each treatment
is computed as
(1− Q̂)/2+(1− p̂)Q̂ι∗R(p̂, Q̂,n)
for R ∈ {M,U}. Table 5 presents the predicted conditional probabilities of the estimated SBE
model versus the observed frequencies in the data.
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Behavioral type 3M 7M 3U 7U All
Unbiased 0.44 0.59 0.52 0.73 0.56
Biased 0.53 0.40 0.41 0.21 0.40
Unclassified 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.04
Observations 77 63 63 63 266
TABLE 6. Distribution of committee member types, based on modal behavior
On the whole, the model fits the empirical distributions rather well in most cases. There are
two notable exceptions. For both unanimity treatments, the model underestimates the frequency
of abstention by uninformed voters and overestimates their frequency of voting for B. However, in
no cases are these differences large in magnitude.
4.2.4. Classification of individual subjects. Using our estimates, we conduct a classification anal-
ysis based on individual behavior. We have 25 observations for each subject, except those in one
majority session for whom we have only 24 observations. Each observation is one of the nine pos-
sible sequences of actions in {AA,AB,Aφ,BA,BB,Bφ,φA,φB,φφ}. We compute, for each subject,
the log-odds, λi, that the subject is a biased voter, calculated as the log of the ratio of the likelihood
they are a biased and the likelihood they are unbiased, evaluated using the estimated parameters,
(p̂, Q̂). We call λi subject i’s Lscore. Thus, for example, for subject i in a 3M session, i’s Lscore is
computed as:
λi(Di|p̂3M, Q̂3M) =
log
{
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1
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i
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φφ[ 112(1− Q̂3M)]k
i
AA+k
i
BB+k
i
AB+k
i
Aφ+k
i
BA+k
i
Bφ
[12 ι
∗
M(p̂3M, Q̂3M,3)Q̂3M +
1
12(1− Q̂3M)]k
i
AA+k
i
BB[(1− ι∗M(p̂3M, Q̂3M,3))Q̂3M + 16(1− Q̂3M)]k
i
φφ
}
.
The cumulative distributions of the Lscores for each treatment are shown in Figure 1 below.
An Lscore greater than 0 corresponds to a subject who is more likely to be a biased type, and
an Lscore below 0 indicates a subject more likely to be an unbiased type. Note that an Lscore
above 3 or below −3 indicate that the odds (under the estimated model) are 20 : 1 that the subject
is correctly classified as a biased or unbiased type, respectively. We use this 20 : 1 odds as our
criterion for saying a subject is “classified” as a type. One can interpret 20 : 1 odds, for descriptive
purposes, as indicating with 95% confidence that the subject is correctly classified by the estimated
model.
Table 6 indicates, for each treatment, the percentage of subjects with Lscores below −3 (clas-
sified as “unbiased”), between −3 and 3 (“unclassified”), and above 3 (classified as “biased”).
Across all sessions, 96% of subjects are classified, which suggests some support for our two-type
mixture model.4 Furthermore, 40% of subjects are classified as biased types, a percentage that
corresponds almost exactly with the estimated value of p̂3M, p̂7M, and p̂3U .
Finally, Figure 2 displays the action distribution for each subject, ordered by their Lscores, for
each treatment. To avoid the figures becoming cluttered, we do not include all 9 possible sequences
of actions in the figure, but condense these into 4 categories: (Iφ, IVote, φφ, φVote), where Iφ =
{Aφ, Bφ}, IVote = {AA, AB, BB, BA}, φφ= {φφ} and φVote = {φA, φB}.
4The classification rates are nearly as high if the classification criterion is considerably strengthened to 100 : 1 odds
(92%), or even 1000 : 1 odds (90%).
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As one can see from Figure 2, for all four treatments, ordering of subjects by their Lscores is
roughly the same as ordering them lexicographically by their relative frequencies of these four
categories. In all treatments, individual Lscores are (almost) monotonically increasing in the prob-
ability of action φVote. Furthermore, in the majority rule committees, individual Lscores are (al-
most) monotonically decreasing in the probability of IVote. Thus, in these treatments, IVote is a
strong indicator of an unbiased type. This indicator is weaker in the unanimity treatments. In fact,
in the unanimity treatments, φφ is at least as strong a marker for an unbiased type as IVote, and
is the strongest indicator for voters in 7U committees. Finally, voters with a roughly equal mix of
three or four of the action categories are harder for the model to classify and therefore tend to have
Lscores with lower absolute values (i.e., centrally located in these graphs).
5. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we study theoretically and experimentally a group decision problem in which in-
formation is costly and therefore it may be rational to remain ignorant. The observed behavior
in the experiment is inconsistent with several of the predictions from the standard common-prior
Bayesian equilibrium model, and suggests an important role for noisy private beliefs. We develop
and estimate a new model, subjective beliefs equilibrium, that can account for the deviations from
Bayesian equilibrium, and also provides a theoretical basis for understanding the observed hetero-
geneity in behavior. In the subjective beliefs equilibrium model, in addition to being rationally
ignorant, some voters may be biased, in the sense of being subject to random, private shocks to
prior beliefs. Therefore, the model proposed has a role both for ignorance and bias in collective
choice environments with costly information, voting, and common values.
One must be cautious in interpreting our finding, as there are at least three critical questions that
must be addressed. First, one of our key findings is the very large extent of uninformed voting,
which appears to be a form of swing voter’s curse. This observation is in stark contrast with
the swing voter’s curse experiments reported in Battaglini et al. (2008, 2010), where uninformed
voting was rare and declined rapidly with experience. This raises the first question: How can we
reconcile our findings with theirs, and what would the subjective beliefs equilibrium predict for the
environment in those earlier studies?
A key difference between our environment and the Battaglini et al. studies is that private signals
are imperfectly informative in our setup, but are perfectly informative in theirs. A second difference
is that signals are costly in our framework, but are exogenously assigned in theirs. Because signals
are weak in our design, sufficiently biased voters have no incentive to acquire information, even
if it were costless. Furthermore, those same voters have subjective priors that swamp the weak
signals of informed voters (if there are any), thus making them immune from the swing voter’s
curse. In a world of perfectly informative signals, as in the Battaglini et al. studies, neither of
these effects are present: biased voters, even with very large biases, would still find it valuable to
buy perfect information for sufficiently low information costs; and biased voters (even with large
biases) would not believe that their prior swamps the information of the informed voters, and hence
they would not think they are immune to the winner’s curse. The bottom line is that both the results
in Battaglini et al. and the behavior in our experiment are consistent with the subjective beliefs
equilibrium model developed in this paper.
The second critical question to address is the following: Why develop a new model to explain
these findings? Aren’t the experimental results also consistent with other existing behavioral the-
ories? Unfortunately, current behavioral theories cannot explain the data in a parsimonious way.
The most obvious candidate is cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005). Cursed or generalized
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cursed equilibria, would indeed predict uninformed voting, however it cannot account for the fact
that those subjects who vote when they are uninformed are also less likely to acquire information.
In fact a considerable fraction of our subjects always or nearly always vote, yet never buy infor-
mation. To the contrary, cursed voters would be more inclined than rational voters to obtain infor-
mation, because they essentially act as if other voters are uninformed, so the free rider effects are
smaller. Furthermore, cursed equilibrium would also predict uninformed voting in the Battaglini et
al. studies, which is inconsistent with the huge difference in the prevalence of uninformed voting
in our experiment and theirs.
There is also a natural alternative explanation for the under-acquisition of information in our
experiment: loss aversion, as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1983). Loss averse voters
would be less inclined to pay for information, since the cost of information is a certain loss in case
the voter is not decisive, or even worse, of the imperfect signal the voter buys is incorrect and the
voter is decisive. However, loss aversion fails to provide an explanation for the extensive unin-
formed voting we observe. In fact, loss aversion might even increase the incentive for uninformed
voters to abstain, in particular if the reference point is taken to be the decision reached by the other
voters without one’s own vote.
The third question concerns the broader applicability of our findings. Does subjective beliefs
equilibrium have interesting new implications about behavior in a broader range of environments
than the specific common-value voting problem we study? While a definitive answer to this last
question is well beyond the scope of our paper, we are cautiously optimistic that the answer will
ultimately be "yes". For many variations of the Condorcet jury environment there are likely to
be significant effects, for example allowing for private values in addition to the common value
component, continuous signals, sequential voting, etc. In the context of common value auction
settings, biased bidders’ behavior would be influenced not only by their private information but also
by their noisy prior beliefs. This, in turn, would dampen the informational content of bids which
could affect the degree to which bidders adjust to the winner’s curse in equilibrium. In ascending
bid auctions, it would change how bidders make inferences from the sequence of observed bids.
Further examples that come to mind include, for example, sequential decision environments in
which informational cascades are possible, lemon markets, asset trading, and signaling games. In
all these instances, understanding the effects of the presence of biased players on the behavior
of unbiased players requires careful equilibrium analysis. Looking forward, both theoretical and
experimental work seem to be needed to achieve the goal of parsimonious, predictive game theory.
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APPENDIX
What follows is a translation of the Spanish-language instructions for the experiment. Minor
differences between treatments are shown in italics.
Instructions
Thank you for accepting to participate in this experiment about decision-making. During the
experiment we shall require your complete attention and careful following of instructions. Further-
more, you will not be allowed to open other computer applications, talking with other participants,
or doing other things that may distract your attention, such as using your cell phone, reading books,
etc.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for your participation in cash. Different partici-
pants may earn different amounts. What you earn will depend, in part, on your decisions, in part
on decisions of other participants, and in part on chance.
The experiment will be administered via computer terminals, and all the interaction between the
participants shall happen through these computers. It is important that you do not talk or try to
communicate in any manner with other participants during the experiment.
During the instruction period, you shall receive a complete description of the experiment and
will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period,
raise your hand and the question will be responded to in a loud voice, so that everybody can hear
it. If you have any questions after the experiment has started, raise your hand and an experimenter
will approach you and try to help you.
This experiment will continue for 25 periods. At the end of the experiment you shall be paid
what you earned, plus a participation fee of $20 pesos. Everybody will receive his/her payment
privately and will not be obliged to tell the others how much s/he earned. Your earnings during the
experiment will be denominated in points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid $8 pesos
for every 1000 points you earned.
Now we start a short instruction period, to be followed by a practice session. You will not be
paid for the practice session. After the practice session, there will be a short comprehension test,
to which you have to respond correctly before continuing to a session that will be paid for.
Rules of committee formation
We start the first period by dividing into seven (7) Committees of three (3) members each.<Note:
in two of the treatments, the instructions instead stated here “three (3) committees of seven (7)
members each,”with the appropriate substitution following through the rest of the text.> Each one
of you will be assigned by the computer to exactly one of these seven (7) Committees. You will
not know the identity of the other members of the Committee to which you belong.
The committee decision task
Your Committee will have to decide between one of two options, which we shall call the Red
Jar and the Blue Jar. The Committees will be making their decisions using the following voting
procedure:
IGNORANCE AND BIAS IN COLLECTIVE DECISION 33
<Instructions for majority treatments>
The final decision of the Committee shall be the option which obtains the largest number of
votes. In case of a draw in the number of votes, or voting in blank by all Committee members,
the final decision of the Committee shall be determined randomly, with probability 12 for each box
color type.
<Instructions for unanimity treatments>
The Red Jar shall be elected by the Committee only when everybody who decides not to vote
in blank, votes for the Red Jar, otherwise the Blue Jar shall be chosen by the Committee.
In other words, the Blue Jar shall be chosen by the Committee when at least one of the voters
votes for the Blue Jar or everybody votes in blank.
Jar assignment by the computer
At the beginning of each period the computer will randomly assign one of two options as the
correct Jar for your Committee. In each period there is a 50/50 chance that the Jar assigned is
Red or Blue.
The computer will choose randomly the correct jar for each Committee and separately for each
period. Therefore, the chance that your Committee is assigned a Red Jar or a Blue Jar shall not be
affected by what happened in previous periods or by what is assigned to other Committees. The
choice shall always be completely random in each period, with a probability of 50% for the Red
Jar and 50% for the Blue Jar.
Buying information
You will not be informed of what is the correct Jar that is assigned to your Committee until after
the Committee has chosen one of the options.
However, before the Committee decides on the option, each Committee member will have an
opportunity to buy a piece of information about the color of the correct Jar assigned. During the
practice period we shall explain exactly how this works.
If you decide to buy information about the color of the correct Jar assigned to your Committee,
the cost of your purchase will be subtracted from your earnings. The cost of buying information
which you would pay, which we shall call sampling cost, shall be equal to a number randomly
chosen between 1 and 100 points.
You will be informed of the sampling cost before you decide whether to buy information, but
you will not be informed about the costs of other members of your Committee.
These costs will be assigned randomly and independently for each of the Committee members
and for each period. Any number between 1 and 100 points would have the same chance of being
chosen.
Voting options
After all Committee members have decided, independently of each other, whether to buy infor-
mation or not, every one of them will have to choose between:
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• Voting for the Red Jar,
• Voting for the Blue Jar, or
• Voting in Blank.
<Next line of Instructions was read only for the unanimity treatments>
A Vote in Blank shall count in favor of the Blue Jar only if everybody decides to vote in blank.
After every member of your Committee has voted, the computer will count the votes in order to
determine the final Committee decision.
Committee decision rule
<Instructions for majority treatments>
The Committee decision is determined using the majority rule.
<Instructions for unanimity treatments>
The Committee decision is determined using the unanimity rule, with <unanimity necessary>
to decide in favor of the Red Jar; otherwise, the Blue Jar shall be chosen.
Payments for committee decisions
If your Committee decision is equal to the color of the Jar that was assigned, every Committee
member will earn 1000 points.
If your Committee decision is not equal to the color of the Jar that was assigned, every Com-
mittee members will earn 0 points.
From the earnings of the Committee members who will have acquired information sampling
costs will furthermore be subtracted.
Committee independence
Other Committees in the room will deal with similar problems, but the correct Jar assigned to
each committee shall be different from that of other Committees. Remember that the Committees
are completely independent and act independently.
After completing the first period, we proceed to the second period. You will be regrouped ran-
domly into seven (7) new Committees and the process will repeat itself. This will continue for a
total of 25 periods.
Description of the screen and the software
We now start the session and go to a practice period in order to familiarize ourselves with the
experimental equipment.
During the practice period, please do not touch the keys, until you are asked to do so, and when
you are instructed to enter certain information, please do exactly what you are asked to do.
Once more, you will not be paid for the practice period.
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We now shall see the first experimental screen on the computer. You should see a similar screen
in front of the room.
Please keep in mind that the screen shown in front is not necessarily identical to the screen that
appears on your computer right now. The slides we show in front are only for illustration purposes.
At the top left of the screen you will see your identification.
This ID shall be the same during the entire experiment. Please note it on the registration sheet
that we have given to you.
Since this is the beginning of a period, you have been assigned by the computer to one of the
seven committees of 3 members. This assignment will change every period.
At the top right of the screen you see the two Jars, each one containing exactly 12 balls. The
Red Jar contains 8 Red balls and 4 Blue balls. The Blue Jar contains 8 Red balls and 4 Blue balls.
The Computer shall randomly assign one of the two jars to your Committee. In each period, the
chance is 50/50 that the assigned Jar is Red or Blue. The assignment will be done 7 times, once
for each Committee. Therefore, the seven committees in this period may have different jars.
You will not know whether the correct Jar for your Committee in this period is Red or Blue
until after all the members of your Committee will have voted either Red, Blue or in Blank and the
Committee decisions is determined. Before voting, one will have a chance to pay the cost and buy
the information that may help you to determine the correct color of the Jar assigned to your group.
Please wait and we will explain how to do it in a moment.
In front of the room you see a screen which shows how to determine the earnings. If the Com-
mittee decision coincides with the color of the Jar assigned to your Committee, you (and every
one of the members of your Committee) will earn 1000 points for the period, and you will earn 0
points if the Committee decision does not coincide.
After the computer assigns a jar to each Committee, you shall see the following screen. Now
you only see one Jar on the screen, but the colors of the balls are hidden, so at this point you cannot
say which Jar has been assigned. This is the correct Jar assigned to your Committee. If it is the
Red Jar it has 8 Red balls and 4 Blue balls; if it is the Blue Jar, it has 8 Blue balls and 4 Red balls.
Please keep in mind that the balls have been reordered randomly in each of the screens by
the main computer, so that it is impossible to guess the location of the balls of each color and you
cannot know which Jar has been assigned to your Committee.
At this point you will have an opportunity to pay a cost between 1 and 100 points to see the
color of exactly one of the balls in the Jar assigned to your Committee. Your cost has been chosen
randomly. Any cost between 1 and 100 points has equal probability of being assigned. The costs
are assigned randomly and independently to each Committee member. These costs will also be
randomly and independently chosen for each period. Your cost for this period is showing on the
screen.
If you do not want to pay the cost, simply click the button that says “Do Not Observe”. In
this case you will not obtain any information about the correct Jar assigned to your Committee.
Otherwise, if you would like to pay the information cost, simply move the cursor to any of the
balls in the Jar and click once. Please wait and do not click for the time being.
If you pay the sampling cost and click on one of the balls, we shall call it your “sample ball”
for this period. This ball is your private information. Other Committee members will also have an
opportunity to acquire a simple ball in the same manner, though locations of the balls in the Jar are
ordered differently for each member, and different members normally may have different costs.
Therefore, different members of the same Committee may be clicking on balls of different color
even for the same Jar. Nevertheless, if the Jar is Red, the Red balls twice as likely to be chosen
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as the Blue balls, and if the Jar is Blue, the Blue balls are twice as likely to be chosen as the Red
balls. The colors of other balls will stay hidden until the end of the period. You will not know how
many other Committee members will have decided to buy a sample ball and how many decided
not to buy. Now continue and make your choice, making a click on a ball, or clicking the “Do Not
Observe” button.
We now go to the voting stage.
At this point you will have three options: vote in favor of the Red Jar, vote in favor of the Blue
Jar, or cast a Blank vote. There are three buttons on the screen, which say “Red”, “Blue”, and “in
Blank.”. You can cast your vote by clicking on the corresponding button. Since this is a practice
period, we shall not let you choose. Instead, we will ask that you vote according to your identi-
fication. If your identification number is between 0 and 7, please vote red. If your identification
number is between 8 and 14, please vote blue. If your identification number is between 15 and 21,
please vote in blank. Of course, during the periods played for money you will be making your own
decisions.
<Instructions for majority treatments>
Remember that only Blue and Red votes will count for the Committee decisions, which shall be
made by the majority. Ties will be resolved randomly.
<Instructions for unanimity treatments>
Remember that unanimity is needed to choose the Red Jar. The Committee decision will be the
Red Jar only if everyone who decides not to vote in blank votes for the Red Jar, otherwise the Blue
Jar will be chosen. In other words, if at least one vote is for the Blue Jar, or if everybody votes in
blank, the Blue Jar will be chosen.
We are now ready for a short comprehension test. Everybody has to respond to all the questions
correctly before we proceed to periods to be paid for. Also, during the test you must respond to all
the questions on page 1 in order to move to page 2. If you answer a question incorrectly, you will
be asked to correct your answer. Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the test,
so that we can come to your desk and respond to your question privately.
Once everybody has voted and finished the test, you will be informed of the final Committee
decision, as well as of the correct Jar assigned to your Committee. Likewise, there will appear a
small screen which will inform you of your earnings for the period, which shall be equal to zero,
because we are in the practice period, which is not being paid for. Please close this little screen so
that we may continue.
In the large screen at the end you will be shown how many votes were received by each Jar and
how many voters decided to cast a blank vote. Also, please take into account that, at the end of the
period the colors of all the balls in your Jar shall be revealed. This screen will mark the end of a
period.
You are also shown your total earnings. Please click the “Accept” button to end the practice
period.
COLUMN ONE shows the period number; COLUMN TWO shows your sampling cost; COL-
UMN THREE shows the color of the sample ball or says “Not Observed” if you decided not to
buy the sample ball; COLUMN FOUR lists your vote; COLUMN FIVE provides the summary of
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the votes in the following order (RED JAR – BLUE JAR – IN BLANK); COLUMN SIX shows
the Committee decision; COLUMN SEVEN shows the correct JAR assigned to the Committee;
COLUMN EIGHT shows your earnings (do not appear now, because we are in practice period).
The table with columns in the bottom of the screen shows the history that includes all the key
information for each period.
To sum up, please, remember the following important things.
<Instructions for the majority treatments >
The Committee decision is taken by the majority rule, with ties resolved randomly.
<Instructions for unanimity treatments>
The Committee decision is taken by the rule requiring unanimity to decide for the Red Jar. The
Committee decision shall be Red Jar only if everybody who decided not to vote in Blank voted for
the Red Jar; otherwise, it will be the Blue Jar. In other words, if at least one person voted for the
Blue Jar, or if everybody votes in blank, the Blue Jar shall be chosen.
The Committee decisions are summed up in the text panel on the top left of the screen, and are
also summed up in the history screen at the bottom of column five. While the experiment contin-
ues, the history screen will gradually show the information about all the previous periods in which
you will have participated.
Are there any questions before we start the session that will be paid for?
We now start with the 25 paying periods of the experiment. If you have any problems or ques-
tions from now on, please raise your hand, and we will come by to help you in private.
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FIGURE 3. Voting screen for informed voter.
